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Introduction
After the 1991 Gulf War Iraq has again developed into a threat to regional stability and into a risk to world peace. National and international studies 1 delineate the capabilities and the risks of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in a dictatorial Iraq under Saddam Hussein. More than forty UN resolutions within the last eleven years have failed to persuade or coerce the Iraqi government into giving up WMD and into a more peaceful and democratic policy. Although containment has worked so far, the danger of supporting terrorists with WMD has increased after the UN weapons inspectors (UNSCOM) were barred from Iraq in December 1998. These WMD, in the hands of terrorists, could pose a direct threat to the U.S. national security, or they could be used to threaten countries in the region.
This strategy for peace in the region and prevention of risks to the U.S. will address and develop the following thesis:
The U.S. must pursue a multilateral strategy to achieve the goal of peace and security in the region.
The strategy specifically aims at destroying all WMD, the production sites, and the delivery means, because they provide Saddam with the ultimate military means for regional dominance.
1 Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction -The Assessment of the British Government, (London, Sep 2002) The following analysis is based on information available up to October 12, 2002. In the first part different options for a strategy shall be discussed based on an assumed endstate for Iraq.
This endstate will go beyond a possible war. The strategy paper covers a threat and risk analysis and considers the recently published National Security Strategy (NSS). The Deibel Model serves as the analytical tool and structure for the first part of the essay. The analysis is not going to elaborate on economic impacts and interdependencies in the region. Although access to oil does play an important role, as Iraq holds 11% of all known oil reserves, its influence is mainly the same for all discussed options.
The second part of the essay will follow the analytical Framework for Military Strategy.
The internal and international setting and constraints will be addressed. The use of force, in so far it is recommended in the first part of the analysis, is to be examined. However, for the purpose of this paper the military details of employment options will not be evaluated. Options will be measured against the various theories on war, specifically from Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and air war theorists. The paper assesses principle courses of action (COAs) for a war with Iraq and a post-war stability. The leading idea for the proposals made is the observation of Liddell
Hart: "The object of war is a better state of peace -…. It is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire." 2
Discussion
Political Strategy
Threat Analysis
President Bush stated in his September 12 address to the UN: "In 1991, the Iraqi regime agreed to destroy and stop developing all weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles, and to prove to the world it has done so by complying with rigorous inspections. Iraq has broken The independent IISS dossier, the above-mentioned assessment of the British Government, and U.S. estimates come to the same principle capability based threat assessment.
Iraq possesses B and C weapons, has tried to acquire A weapons and has at its avail delivery means that range up to 650 Km.
As threat is based on capability and will, the latter shall also briefly be addressed. Within 34 years of Saddam's dictatorship Iraq has fought wars against Iran and Kuwait, has threatened Saudi-Arabia, has attacked Israel and has used chemical weapons against its own population.
The will to threaten the use or to use military capabilities, including WMD, is apparent. So far,
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Iraq has only used WMD against an opponent lacking this capability. Regional dominance with the ultimate aim of at least balancing Israel seems to be Saddam's main goal.
Risk Analysis
This brief analysis addresses the risks based on above threat evaluation for the U.S. and for the region. Because of the restricted means of delivery, the danger for mainland U.S. remains small. However, any use of WMD against the U.S., although it might cause only limited direct damage, could have an extremely negative impact on the economy, similar to the September 11 terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, more clear attention must be paid to the perils for the region.
Both, the risks posed by an Iraq that will remain possessing WMD, and the risks of waging war against Saddam Hussein in order to destroy these WMD, need to be assessed.
Saddam's Iraq has proven twice within the previous 20 years that it is willing and capable to wage war against its neighbours in order to gain regional dominance. There is no reason to believe Saddam Hussein might have changed this principal stance. Threatening the use of WMD might give him the edge required to achieve this goal and to counterbalance Israel. However, if the survival of the regime or the country were not at stake, it is unlikely that the Iraqi regime would use B and C weapons or nuclear weapons, if finally acquired, because it must fear the U.S'. or Israel's retaliation. "During the gulf war, we knew Iraq had chemical weapons, and our intelligence estimated that they could have killed as many as 10,000 U.S. soldiers with them.
Why didn't they use them? Because they knew that it would be the end of Baghdad." 
Political Endstate
The political endstate to be achieved, based on the NSS 6 , is to eliminate a threat to the U.S. and her allies and friends. In addition to this elimination, a better and more stable peace for the region must be attained. Consequently, the short-term goal is to detect, control and eliminate all WMD. The medium-term goal must be to achieve a regime change without changing the political geography, the power balance and borders. And thirdly, the long-term endstate must encompass the promotion of democracy, liberty and free market economy throughout the Middle East in order to prevent further conflict in the foreseeable future.
Internal Framework
Internally the U.S government's policy has to obtain public and congressional support. Below 40% would support a unilateral attack or any attack that was not backed by Congress or by the UN. Congressional backing of any U.S. action, including war, is given. 8 The Gallup poll strongly suggests that the U.S. must develop a multilateral strategy for Iraq. The NSS emphasizes that a unilateral approach could be pursued, if required.
International Framework
Most important for any action is a UN resolution. Without a Security Council Resolution (SCR), it seems to be unlikely that the U.S. can build up sufficient international support for any 
Means
Principally all means of soft-power and hard-power available could be utilized to achieve the political aims. However, not all available means are suited and fit the specific problem. For the short-term goal, the detection and destruction of WMD, compellence with a threat of force could meet the requirement. This threat must be credible. For the medium term and long-term goals, regime change and a stabilised, democratised region, public diplomacy, foreign aid and the influence of soft-power might be best suited. In order to achieve credibility with the Iraqi people, these means must be exercised by multilateral and regional efforts. Otherwise, U.S. cultural dominance could end up being counterproductive.
It is of utmost importance that the U.S. and her Western allies avoid being seen as Christian neoimperialists or Jewish led aggressors who are only interested in dominating an oil-rich region.
7 Ways
During the discussion of possible ways, courses of action (COA) for the U.S., it does not seem to be suitable to distinguish clearly between short-, medium-and long-term aims. interdependent. A medium-term aim could also be achieved in a very short timeframe through adequate means. In the following, only a unilateral approach and a multilateral one are evaluated.
The multilateral approach will be subdivided in: firstly, the use of weapons inspectors backed by force, and secondly, the destruction of WMD, delivery and development capabilities directly without previous inspections. All COAs have in common, that through foreign aid, public diplomacy and soft-power the long-term goals should be achieved.
COA 1-A U.S. unilateral action to disarm Iraq would undoubtedly mean to launch an attack against Iraq. This COA is approved by Congress and is feasible. Destruction of all WMD through war would require occupying the country after having won the war. Only through occupation an almost total destruction of WMD could be achieved.
COA 2 -U.S. supports UN weapons inspection teams to detect and destroy WMD, delivery means, and development capabilities. No direct military threat linked to that option.
COA 3 -U.S. supports UN weapons inspection teams to detect and destroy WMD and builds up direct multinational threat in order to achieve compliance with a SCR. This COA could be pursued with either one (U.S. proposal) or two (France, Russia proposal) UN resolutions.
Inherent in this COA is a high likelihood of war with Iraq. 16 History has shown that this possibility is highly unlikely.
Comparison of Options
Dictatorial systems (e.g. Nazi-Germany or North Vietnam) are unlikely to crumble when being threatened. The U.S. will undoubtedly succeed in a war against Iraq. But unilateralism would make it unbearably difficult to rebuild an Iraq after the war. Moreover, a unilateral war could distract too much from the war against terrorism. "We cannot fight a second monumental struggle without detracting from the first one." 17 COA 2 may encompass initial low costs and low risks, but is highly likely to have long-term disadvantages. Saddam is likely to not cooperate with the inspectors. Consequently, the recommended option is COA 3. This COA has the greatest flexibility, the highest degree of goal accomplishment by calculable risks and costs.
However, the overriding criterion for COA 3 is that this multilateral approach has the best chances to achieve long-term stability by meeting at the same time short-and medium-term 
Conclusion and Recommendation
The comparison of options clearly leads to the recommendation to support a UN resolution for re-establishing the weapons inspectors in Iraq. This determined diplomacy must be backed by force. The inspections are to be based on a robust mandate. The teams should be protected and directly supported by an international military force. If Saddam did not comply within a preset timeframe, multinational force should be used to destroy all WMD, delivery means, and development capability. War then must lead to a regime change, but should avoid total disarmament. In this case, a post war peacekeeping force has to remain in country to avoid a split up of Iraq with a destabilizing effect for Turkey and the remainder of the region. This approach will create the best conditions for a long-term change and stabilization through democratisation in the region. However, the latter will only be successful, if the U.S. is able to address the Israel-Palestine conflict properly and promotes democracy in other neighbouring states through, initially, unconditional engagement.
War Strategy
Overview and Assumptions
If a war was to be fought, the assumption must be made that Saddam misread the situation totally and would not act rationally, at least not following Western notions of rationality. As already discussed above, this analysis will only consider the multilateral approach as the most promising road to achieve long-term goals. Nevertheless, it should be stressed again, in accordance with the NSS, Congressional backing, and the capabilities of the U.S. military, a unilateral approach to defeat Iraq would be possible. China it is a question of the price, for the Europeans of the post-war economic influence.
Keeping these assumptions in mind and following some theoretical principles, a war strategy has to develop a strategic situation so advantageous, "that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this." 
Risk Analysis
The risk assessment in this paragraph will only look at war and combat risks. The already stated risks from paragraph 2.1.2 will not be repeated. In summary, allied forces must be prepared for chemical, biological and urban warfare.
Israel must expect a biological or chemical attack. The American and the world population should also be prepared to face these risks.
Military Objectives Including Centre of Gravity
The Allied military objectives must be to destroy all WMD and means of delivery, decapitate or destroy Republican Guards, to achieve unconditional surrender, which certainly will result in a regime change, and to establish preconditions for a democratic development process in a still unified Iraq. This post-conflict setting requires many peacekeeping troops on the ground. 20 These forces must be made available in region prior to an attack in order to prevent a power vacuum and civil unrest and new safe havens for terrorist groups.
Following the Clausewitzian principle, the strategic centre of gravity (COG) for Iraq is its leadership and its rationale, however irrational it might seem to be for Westerners. The 20 A UN international advisory group looked in 2001 into the requirement of peacekeepers for Afghanistan and concluded in its report that in order to achieve the same level of security as in Kosovo or in East Timor, 300,000 to 500,000 peacekeepers would be required. This estimate could serve as a basis for any post war peacekeeping operation in Iraq.
operational COG comprises of all WMD and their respective delivery means. Destroying these takes Saddam's capabilities away to attack a coalition's COG, the coalition itself. This coalition is specifically dependent on Israel's behaviour. As Saddam does not gain his strength and does not legitimate his power from people and their passion, despite the recent elections, a military strategy only needs to avoid turning the Iraqi people into enemies. This requires clear limitations on collateral damage. Although "the power to hurt is bargaining power (and) to exploit it is diplomacy …" 21 , this hurting power should not be used against the Iraqi population. To inflict suffering only achieves its aim if the leadership is receptive. Saddam is not.
Saddam's military objective will be to draw Israel into the war to split any fragile coalition and to inflict as many casualties as possible to the U.S. in order to increase internal resistance (Vietnam effect). He might also try to prolong a war to a maximum by defending key cities (Baghdad and his home town Tikrit) only and draw coalition forces into urban fighting. His strategy could be backed by direct terrorist attacks with compellent aims on the homeland U.S.
and her allies. He will use the media to stiffen American and European war resistance.
Multilateral Force Option -Capabilities and Vulnerabilities
According to Central command estimates, 22 Iraq's military is able to field some 700,000
active and reserve troops with some 2,200 main battle tanks and an estimated 2,000 artillery guns. Of these troops, 48,000 -60,000 are organized in Republican Guard divisions. One of these divisions is most likely assigned the task to protect Saddam Hussein.
Because of the no-fly zones, Iraq has deployed its ground forces mainly in and around
Baghdad. Tikrit, the hometown of Saddam and most of his closest supporters, also appears to be heavily defended. Iraq's air force, with some 30,000 personnel and about 316 combat aircraft, is 
Strategic Concept
In Saddam Hussein's Iraq, one could argue, the Clausewitzian trinity comprised of Government and rationality, military commander and creativity, and people and passion is not in balance. The people are oppressed and the top commanders are highly dependent on the political leader. Consequently, the most successful approach toward a fast victory seems to be through attacking the political leadership and decapitating the military. This approach will further upset the triangle's balance. However, the question remains on how to approach the attack of the political leadership while at the same time minimizing the above-mentioned risks.
Two possible COAs will be discussed. Low. Opposition in staging areas could be controlled.
High
The recommended strategic concept follows COA 2. Despite the stated disadvantages and risks for U.S. and coalition personnel, it encompasses the highest degree of mission accomplishment.
An attack from the north and south simultaneously, followed by a move toward Baghdad and Tirkrit, could exactly develop that kind of advantageous strategic situation, where a continuation of the battle would produce the decision. The likelihood that air operations will create an environment in which the Iraqi people would oust Saddam seems to be remote. The overriding criterion for COA 2 is that it creates the best military preconditions for a relatively smooth regime change and long-term stability in the region.
Potential Results and Road from Military to political Endstate
At the end of the war a U.S. dominated coalition force will have occupied all of Iraq.
Most WMD stocks, laboratories and launch facilities will be known or destroyed within thr following months. Saddam is likely to be captured or killed, a new government installed. The occupation force now has to be replaced by a peacekeeping force. The international community must partake in nation-building on a by far broader basis than in the war. Of utmost importance is to avoid a break-up of Iraq and outside perception of imperialistic rule. Nevertheless, the Kurdish minority in the north and the Shiites in the south will expect a greater degree of independence. These expectations have to be met in order to avoid further turbulences. The Arab neighbours should be encouraged to take active part in peacekeeping and nation-building. Only their participation will avoid the perception that the war against Saddam Hussein was a religiously motivated war.
Conclusion and Recommendation
It is recommended to pursue a war strategy directed against the leadership of Iraq and against the WMD storage and possible launch facilities. A combined and joint campaign should be executed despite high risks for own military personnel. Only a combined (multinational) campaign will be publicly supported. Only a joint campaign with an almost parallel use of air and ground forces will prevent chaos. Prior to the outbreak of combat, a multinational peacekeeping force needs to be organized, backed by a UN resolution. In addition, the Iraqi opposition in the U.S. and other Western countries should be prepared to take on some responsibilities in a post-war Iraq. The U.S. should use her strong presence in the region to coerce Israel and Palestine into a peaceful agreement for coexistence. If not, the mid-term aim and the long-term aim for Iraq and the entire region are at stake. An active engagement policy focusing primarily on Egypt and Saudi Arabia, including foreign aid and public diplomacy, must pave the road toward more democracy in the region.
Summary
The aim of this paper was to develop a strategy for Iraq, dealing with the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his perceived aim to achieve regional dominance through WMD. The first part discussed a political strategy that included the threat of war. In the second part the principles of a war strategy were addressed.
It seems to be apparent that only a multilateral approach in dealing with Saddam
Hussein's Iraq would be fully successful. Although unilateral action is backed by the Congress and in line with the NSS, it lacks the popular support. Unilateralism endangers a positive development of the region, alienates America from her allies, and puts a heavy long-term burden on the U.S.
The approach toward Iraq should explore first diplomatic means and seek to get UN and allied backing for a robust weapons inspectors' mandate. Included in that mandate must be the threat of force in case of non-compliance. In order to avoid in situ problems, the teams must be protected and supported by military force. As discussed, isolation and economic embargo are not able to coerce Saddam. However, they should remain in place till the desired outcome of destruction of WMD, production facilities and delivery capability is achieved. The goal is disarmament. Only if that cannot be achieved through this new and robust, militarily supported UN mandate, should the next, the belligerent step, be taken. Political and military leaders responsible "...must recognize … that once the struggle of competing wills ensues, it may not be possible to stop before reaching the end of the road." 27
